NSA: Income from Trademark Lease May Be Taxed Under Lump-Sum Taxation

In its judgment of 18 June 2026 (case no. II FSK 1023/23), the Supreme Administrative Court (NSA) addressed the classification of income derived from leasing a trademark withdrawn from business activity into private assets. The ruling is of significant practical importance, as it confirms the possibility of taxing such income under lump-sum taxation on recorded revenues and indicates that the classification depends on the nature of the agreement, rather than the subject of the lease itself.

 

The case concerned an individual conducting sole proprietorship activity in the food processing sector. The taxpayer owned a registered trademark which he intended to withdraw from business assets into private property. The trademark was to be subsequently leased to a limited liability company for remuneration. It was also indicated that the lease agreement would be concluded outside the taxpayer’s business activity. At the same time, the taxpayer planned to cease food processing operations and begin providing administrative and office services to the company, including order handling, invoicing, preparation of accounting documents, maintaining work time records, and drafting analyses and contracts. In an amended submission, additional services such as commercial intermediation were also indicated.

The taxpayer sought confirmation that both the income from leasing the trademark and the income from the planned service activities could be subject to lump-sum taxation on recorded revenues. He proposed applying rates of 8.5% and 12.5% (for income exceeding PLN 100,000) to trademark lease income, and an 8.5% rate to the service income.

In its individual ruling of 15 February 2022 (reference no. 0115-KDIT1.4011.856.2021.3.MR), the Director of the National Tax Information (KIS) partially disagreed with the taxpayer’s position. The authority held that income from leasing a trademark should not be classified as income from lease or tenancy, but rather as income from property rights under Article 18 of the Personal Income Tax Act. According to the authority, the decisive factor is the subject of the agreement—the trademark as an intangible asset—rather than the legal form of the contract. As a result, such income could not benefit from lump-sum taxation applicable to lease and tenancy income. At the same time, the authority confirmed that income from the planned administrative and brokerage services could be taxed under lump-sum taxation at the 8.5% rate.

The Voivodship Administrative Court in Kraków, in its judgment of 27 October 2022 (case no. I SA/Kr 504/22), disagreed with the tax authority and annulled the ruling. The Court held that the key issue was whether income from trademark leasing should be classified as “lease and tenancy” or “property rights,” since this classification determines eligibility for lump-sum taxation. In the Court’s view, rental income from a trademark lease should be classified under lease and tenancy income (Article 10(1)(6) of the PIT Act). The Court emphasized that lease agreements may also cover property rights, and that the decisive factor is the nature of the contract, not the fact that the subject of the lease is a trademark. According to the Court, the income results directly from the lease agreement, while the trademark itself is only the subject of that agreement.

The Supreme Administrative Court upheld the position of the first-instance court in its judgment of 18 June 2026 (case no. II FSK 1023/23), confirming that in the case of trademark leasing, the source of income is the lease agreement and the rent derived from it, rather than the trademark right itself. This means that such income, if generated outside business activity, may be subject to lump-sum taxation on recorded revenues.

The ruling provides important guidance for taxpayers licensing or leasing intellectual property rights, confirming that the classification of income depends on the legal nature of the contractual relationship between the parties, rather than solely on the type of asset being used. It also aligns with the established line of administrative court jurisprudence in this area.

Joanna Chwiralska

Supervisor